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Abstract
We explore a view of the crisis as a shock to investor sentiment that led to the collapse of a
bubble or pyramid scheme in nancial markets. We embed this view in a standard model of the
nancial accelerator and explore its empirical and policy implications. In particular, we show how
the model can account for: (i) a gradual and protracted expansionary phase followed by a sudden
and sharp recession; (ii) the connection (or lack of connection!) between nancial and real economic
activity and; (iii) a fast and strong transmission of shocks across countries. We also use the model
to explore the role of scal policy.
JEL classication: E32, E44, G01, O40
Keywords: bubbles, nancial accelerator, credit constraints, nancial crisis, pyramid schemes5
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Summary
The economics profession was taken by surprise by the severity of the recent crisis and by the speed 
with which it spread throughout the world. Providing an accurate diagnosis of the problem and 
agreeing even on the most basic policy prescriptions has proved to be a difficult challenge over the 
last few years. Part of the reason for this is that state-of-the-art macroeconomic models used for 
policy analysis typically emphasize nominal rigidities and labor market frictions, while they 
downplay the role of financial frictions. To understand the recent crisis we need models that place 
financial frictions at center stage. 
Recent attempts to do this build on basic models of the “financial accelerator” mechanism. These 
models were designed to show how financial frictions amplify the impact of traditional 
macroeconomic shocks through their effects on net worth. The intuition is simple: the role of 
financial markets is to intermediate funds from those that have them (i.e. the savers or creditors) to 
those who know what to do with them (i.e. the entrepreneurs or borrowers). In order for this 
intermediation to be feasible, however, savers need guarantees from entrepreneurs that the funds they 
lend them will be paid back once the investments give their fruits. The net worth of entrepreneurs, 
i.e. the amount of future funds that they can pledge today to creditors, is akin to those guarantees. 
When net worth is low, entrepreneurs cannot borrow enough and the economy operates at low levels 
of efficiency. When net worth is high, entrepreneurs can borrow enough and the economy operates at 
high levels of efficiency. 
There are two alternative ways of using the financial accelerator model to think about the current 
crisis. The first one is based on the notion that, as a result of unprecedented changes in the financial 
system, the financial accelerator mechanism has become very powerful at amplifying traditional 
macroeconomic shocks. Consequently, small “real” shocks that affect the efficiency of investment or 
the productivity of financial intermediation can now unleash very large contractions of credit and 
deep recessions. This view thus stresses the amplifying role of financial markets, but it still requires 
us to identify the specific shock to economic fundamentals that pushed the world economy into such 
a severe recession. 
A second and complementary way of using the model is to acknowledge that, instead of a small 
macroeconomic shock of the traditional kind, the world economy suffered a large shock to investor 
sentiment that drastically reduced net worth. Although intuitively appealing, it is hard to articulate 
this view because we lack a formal model of such shocks. This paper provides such a model. It 
shows how, within the financial accelerator framework, changes in investor sentiment affect the 
market valuation of firms and therefore their net worth. In particular, investor optimism gives rise to 
bubbles that increase the price of firms. These bubbles are useful because they raise net worth, 
leading to a credit expansion and a boom. When investors become pessimistic, these bubbles burst 
and net worth falls, leading to a credit contraction and a recession. Thus, changes in investor 
sentiments have an effect on output even if the investment opportunities faced by firms, the total 
resources available for intermediation and the technology used for it do not change. 
This alternative perspective amounts to more than just an academic exercise. On the empirical side, 
introducing bubbles in the financial accelerator model allows us to provide a simple unified narrative 
of the main macroeconomic developments of the recent past up to the current crisis as a bubbly 
episode that started in the early 1990s and ended in 2007-08. This narrative fits very well with the 
broad turn of events of these last 20 years: a steady, protracted expansion phase that entailed 
significant increases in asset prices and in credit to the private sector, and a fast, severe downturn 
during which these variables collapsed. It also provides a potential explanation to the speed and the 
strength with which shocks spread across sectors and countries. Finally, this alternative approach has 
important policy implications. In particular, we show that the case for a fiscal stimulus package and 
its optimal design depend crucially on whether the shock that led to the crisis is a traditional 
macroeconomic shock or a shock to investor sentiment. 6
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History shows that capitalist economies alternate between expansions and recessions. Thus,
even in the heights of the expansion that went from the mid 1990s to the subprime mortgage crisis
in the summer of 2007 it was widely understood that a recession would someday hit the world
economy. But nobody anticipated what has happened since. The depth of the current recession
and the blazing speed with which it has propagated across industries and countries far exceeds even
the most pessimistic scenarios. In fact, we need to go back to the Great Depression of the 1930s to
nd a crisis of a similar magnitude and global scope. It is still not clear however that the lessons
we learned from that earlier crisis are useful to understand what is going on today.
As everybody else, macroeconomists have been taken by surprise by the unfolding of events.
Even worse, providing an accurate diagnosis of the problem and coming up with clear-cut policy
prescriptions has proved to be a di!cult challenge. Part of the reason for this, of course, is that
state-of-the-art macroeconomic models used for policy analysis are poorly adapted to this task.
These models typically emphasize nominal rigidities and labor market frictions, and downplay the
role of nancial frictions. As a profession, we must go back to the drawing board and reverse these
priorities. To understand the current crisis we need models that place nancial frictions at center
stage.
Recent attempts to do this build on the seminal contributions by Bernanke and Gertler (1989)
and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) who developed models of the “nancial accelerator” mechanism.1
These models were designed to show how nancial frictions amplify the impact of traditional macro-
economic shocks through their eects on net worth. The intuition is simple: the role of nancial
markets is to intermediate funds from those that have them (i.e. the savers or creditors) to those
who know what to do with them (i.e. the entrepreneurs or borrowers). This intermediation is useful
because it raises the average e!ciency of the economy and thus the welfare of its inhabitants. In
order for this intermediation to be feasible, however, savers need guarantees from entrepreneurs
that the funds they lend them (plus an attractive enough return!) will be paid back once the
investments give their fruits. The net worth of entrepreneurs, i.e. the amount of future funds that
they can pledge today to creditors, is akin to those guarantees. When net worth is low, entrepre-
neurs cannot borrow enough and the economy operates at low levels of e!ciency. When net worth
is high, entrepreneurs can borrow enough and the economy operates at high levels of e!ciency.
1Of course, these initial models were quite stylized. Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999)
developed more sophisticated versions for quantitative analysis. Recently, Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Fernandez-
Villaverde and Ohanian (2010) have used versions of this model to study the current crisis.7
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There are two alternative ways of using the nancial accelerator model to think about the current
crisis. The rst one is based on the notion that, as a result of unprecedented changes in the nancial
system, the nancial accelerator mechanism has become very powerful at amplifying traditional
macroeconomic shocks. Consequently, small shocks that aect the e!ciency of investment or the
productivity of nancial intermediation can now unleash very large contractions of credit and deep
recessions. This view thus stresses the amplifying role of nancial markets, but it still requires us
to identify the specic shock to economic fundamentals that pushed the world economy into such
a severe recession.
A second and complementary way of using the model is based on the notion that, instead of
a small shock of the traditional kind, the world economy has suered a large shock to investor
sentiment that has drastically reduced net worth. Although intuitively appealing, it is hard to
articulate this view because we lack a formal model of such shocks. Our main goal in writing
these notes is to provide such a model. We show how, within the nancial accelerator framework,
changes in investor sentiment aect the market valuation of rms and therefore their net worth. In
particular, investor optimism gives rise to bubbles that increase the price of rms. These bubbles
are useful because they raise net worth, leading to a credit expansion and a boom. When investors
become pessimistic, these bubbles burst and net worth falls, leading to a credit contraction and a
recession.
This alternative perspective amounts to more than just an academic exercise. On the empirical
side, introducing bubbles in the nancial accelerator model allows us to provide a simple unied
narrative of the main macroeconomic developments of the recent past up to the current crisis as a
bubbly episode that started in the early 1990s and ended in 2007-08. This narrative ts very well
with the broad turn of events as illustrated in Figure 1: a steady, protracted expansion phase that
entailed signicant increases in asset prices and in credit to the private sector, and a fast, severe
downturn during which these variables collapsed. It also provides a potential explanation to the
speed and the strength with which shocks spread across sectors and countries. More generally, the
introduction of bubbles in a model of nancial frictions can provide answers to two burning questions
for current macroeconomics: (i) Why do asset (stock, housing, ...) prices  uctuate so much and in
ways that seem so unrelated to fundamentals? and (ii) How is it that these  uctuations in asset
prices have such signicant eects on real activity? The importance of these questions goes beyond
understanding the events of recent years: as the postwar experience of industrialized economies
shows, substantial  uctuations in asset prices are not uncommon and, when they happen, they are8
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typically associated with substantial macroeconomic developments.2
On the policy side, viewing the crisis as the collapse of a bubble has far reaching implications for
the role of scal policy as a stabilization tool.3 The case for a scal stimulus package and its optimal
design depend crucially on whether the shock that led to the crisis is a traditional macroeconomic
shock or a shock to investor sentiment. If the latter, we describe the type of scal package that
can restore the economy to its pre-crisis path. Whether this package is feasible, though, depends
crucially on the credibility of the government. When credibility is low, attempts to undo the crisis
through the use of scal policy might merely cause it to move across markets, from private nancial
markets to public-debt markets.
In thinking about the origin and consequences of the current crisis, there are dierent, but
complementary, lines of research that can be pursued. One approach is to focus on the particular
details and institutional arrangements of nancial markets, emphasizing the role of specicf e a t u r e s
— like regulation or the incentives of certain market participants — in generating and fueling the
crisis.4 An alternative approach is to take a step back and think instead of the general features
that have characterized nancial markets, and more generally the macroeconomy, in recent years.
This approach, which we adopt in these notes, is also followed in recent papers by Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2010) and Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008). As mentioned already, Gertler and
Kiyotaki draw on the insights of the nancial accelerator literature in order to interpret the current
crisis. We dier from them by modeling the crisis as a shock to investor sentiment that ended a
bubbly episode. Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas also view the crisis as the bursting of a bubble,
although they do not provide a formal model of how bubbles can arise in equilibrium. They argue
that the bubble was fueled by a shortage of nancial assets in the world economy and focus on the
chronology of events that followed its bursting.
Methodologically, we build on the traditional literature on rational bubbles that goes back to
Samuelson (1958). Tirole (1985) analyzed the conditions for the existence of such bubbles in the
context of a production economy. Our model is close to Tirole’s with the dierence that, in our
2In analyzing housing and equity prices in industrialized economies during the postwar period, IMF (2003) found
that equity price busts occured on average once every 13 years and entailed price declines of about 45 percent, whereas
housing busts occured on average every 20 years and involved price declines of about 30 percent. Both equity and
housing price busts were associated with output losses re ecting declines in both consumption and investment.
3In this regard, this paper is related to Bernanke and Gertler (1999) who studied the design of monetary policy
in a nancial-accelerator model with bubbles. Although similar in spirit, both papers dier substantially on their
emphasis. In the model of Bernanke and Gertler, the emphasis is on policy analysis: asset bubbles are introduced
exogenously and not as an equilibrium phenomenon. In these notes, instead, the emphasis is in the development of
a consistent framework to study the interaction between asset bubbles and the nancial accelerator mechanism.
4For such an account, see Brunnermeier (2009).9
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setup, the presence of nancial frictions: (i) relaxes the conditions for the existence of bubbles
and; (ii) it implies that bubbles can be expansionary and increase credit and output. Woodford
(1990) and Azariadis and Smith (1993) were, to the best of our knowledge, the rst to study
the relationship between contracting frictions and the existence of rational bubbles. Our nding
regarding the relationship between nancial frictions and the possibility of expansionary bubbles is
related to recent results by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006), Kraay and Ventura (2007), Farhi
and Tirole (2009), Kocherlakota (2009) and Ventura (2011). Our framework diers from these last
papers in two crucial respects, though. The rst is that we study expansionary bubbles in the
context of a standard production economy. The second is that, as in Martin and Ventura (2010),
bubbles in our setting can arise even if all investments are dynamically e!cient in the economy’s
fundamental equilibrium.5
These notes are organized as follows. Section 1 develops a stylized version of the nancial
accelerator model and explores the eects of traditional macroeconomic shocks. Section 2 shows
that the model has additional equilibria with bubbly episodes and uses them to interpret the crisis.
Sections 3 and 4 extend the framework to study how policy can react to the bursting of a bubble,
and how bubbly episodes are transmitted across countries. Section 5 concludes.
1 A canonical model of nancial frictions and business cycles
In a recent paper, Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) develop a “canonical framework to help organize
thinking about credit market frictions and aggregate economic activity in the context of the current
crisis” (p.1). This framework is built around an agency cost that limits the ability of rms to pledge
future resources to their creditors. This section develops a stripped-down version of this framework
and uses it in the way that Gertler and Kiyotaki suggest.
1.1 Basic setup
Our model builds on Samuelson’s two-period overlapping-generations structure. The world economy
contains an innite sequence of generations, indexed by w 5 (4>+4).E a c hg e n e r a t i o nc o n t a i n s
a continuum of individuals of size one, indexed by l 5 Lw. Individuals maximize expected old-age
5There is also a literature on bubbles and economic growth that is closely related to this paper. Saint-Paul (1992),
Grossman and Yanagawa (1993), and King and Ferguson (1993) extend the Samuelson-Tirole model to economies
with endogenous growth due to externalities in capital accumulation. In their models, bubbles slow down the growth
rate of the economy. Olivier (2000) uses a similar model to show how, if tied to R&D rms, bubbles might foster
technological progress and growth.
410
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consumption, i.e. Xlw = Hw {flw+1};w h e r eXlw and flw+1 are the utility function when young and
the old-age consumption of individual l of generation w.T onance their consumption, individuals
supply one unit of labor when young. Since individuals only care about old age consumption, they
save their entire labor income. Since individuals are risk-neutral, they always invest their savings
so as to maximize their expected return.
The world economy also contains an innite sequence of generations of rms, indexed by m 5 Mw.
The set Mw contains all rms that produce in period w. Firms produce output with a Cobb-Douglas
technology: I (omw>n mw)=o13
mw · n
mw;w h e r eomw and nmw are the labor and capital used by rm m in
period w. Firms also produce capital with a technology that uses one unit of output in period w to
produce Dmw units of capital in period w +1 . The capital stock of rm m e v o l v e sa sf o l l o w s :
nmw+1 = Dmw · ]mw +( 1 ) · nmw,( 1 )
where ]mw is the investment of rm m,a n d 5 [0>1] is the rate of depreciation. To motivate the
need for intermediation, we make two assumptions about the life cycle of rms. The rst one is






w if m 5 MQ
w




w is the set of “new” rms in period w,i . e .t h es e to frms that are created in period w and
start producing output in period w+1.W er e f e rt ow as the investment e!ciency and assume that
it  uctuates randomly with w A 1. The second assumption is that only a subset LH
w of generation
w is capable of starting a rm. We refer to this subset as the “entrepreneurs” and assume that it
has measure % 5 [0>1]. Everybody can manage an old rm.
Workers and savings are allocated to rms in the labor and nancial markets. The labor market
is competitive and all workers and rms can trade in it with zero or negligible transaction costs.







· nmw,( 3 )
where zw is the wage rate per unit of labor. Equation (3) is the labor demand of rm m,w h i c h
results from hiring labor until its marginal product equals the wage. Since the aggregate supply of11
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labor is one, market clearing implies that:
zw =( 1 ) · n
w ,( 4 )
where nw 
R
mMMw nmw is the aggregate capital stock. Since all rms use the same capital-labor ratio,
this must be the aggregate one. Thus, Equation (4) says that the wage equals the marginal product
of labor evaluated at the aggregate capital-labor ratio.
We turn next to the key piece of the model, namely, the nancial market. This market consists
of a credit market where individuals lend to rms, and a stock market where individuals buy and
sell old rms. Both markets are competitive and all savers and rms can trade in them with zero or
negligible transaction costs. Firms can write contingent credit contracts, but there is an agency cost
that limits the overall ability of rms to obtain credit. In particular, rms can commit or pledge to
their creditors only a fraction !w of their resources in period w. We refer to !w as the nancial friction
and assume that it  uctuates randomly within the unit interval. We adopt the convention that, in
period w, individuals know the realization of shocks with index w (i.e. w and !w), but they do not
know the realizations of shocks with index w +1(i.e. w+1 and !w+1). The resources of the rm in
period w +1consist of the revenue from sales net of labor costs, i.e. I (omw+1>n mw+1)  zw+1 · omw+1,
plus the rm’s resale or market value, i.e. Ymw+1. Therefore, we have that in each possible state of
nature in period w +1the following constraint holds:
Uw+1 · imw  !w+1 · [I (omw+1>n mw+1)  zw+1 · omw+1 + Ymw+1],( 5 )
where imw is the credit that rm m obtains in the credit market in period w,a n dUw+1 is the (gross)
ex-post return to loans. Since Uw+1 might be contingent on any variable which is known in period
w +1 ,w er e f e rt oHwUw+1, as the interest rate. The right-hand side of Equation (5) captures the
concept of net worth. That is, the amount of future resources that rms can use as a collateral to
obtain credit today. The shock !w+1 captures the quality of the legal system and other institutional
arrangements that support credit.
Maximization implies that non-entrepreneurs will lend and buy old rms simultaneously if and12
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only if the expected return to owning an old rm equals the interest rate:6





w+1 · [Dmw · ]mw +( 1 ) · nmw]  Uw+1 · imw + Ymw+1
ª
Ymw + ]mw  imw
if m 5 Mw,( 6 )
where the maximization is subject to the constraint in Equation (5). To compute the return to
owning an old rm, note that in period w the owner must spend the purchase price plus the cost of
new capital minus credit. Then, in period w+1the owner obtains the revenue from sales net of labor
and nancing costs plus the resale value of the rm. Maximization also implies that entrepreneurs






w+1 · Dmw · ]mw  Uw+1 · imw + Ymw+1
ª
]mw  imw
if m 5 MQ
w ,( 7 )
where the maximization is once again subject to the constraint in Equation (5). Unlike old rms,
new rms start without capital and their owners, who are also their creators, do not have to pay a
price for them, i.e. nmw = Ymw =0if m 5 MQ
w .
The next step is to determine the interest rate and rm prices that clear the credit and stock
market. We are interested in equilibria in which rms are credit constrained. Our assumption that
credit contracts can be fully state contingent implies that, in those equilibria, Equation (5) must
hold with equality in all states of nature since rms have borrowed as much as possible against
their future net worth. We conjecture that the following interest rate and rm prices clear the
credit and stock market,
HwUw+1 =  · n31
w+1 +1 ,( 8 )
Ymw =( 1 ) · nmw,( 9 )
and then verify this conjecture. Equation (8) says that the interest rate equals the return to
producing a unit of capital within an old rm. Equation (9) says that the price of a rm equals
the cost of replacing the capital that it owns. Ideally, all investment should take place within new
rms, as these have a technological advantage when producing new capital. This is not possible
however if the nancial friction is severe enough. The conjecture in Equations (8) and (9) turns out
to be correct if the equilibrium is ine!cient and some investment is carried out within old rms.
At the proposed interest rate and rm prices, entrepreneurs strictly prefer to start new rms
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than to lend or purchase old rms. Moreover, since the interest rate is below the return to investing
in new rms the owners of these rms ask for as much credit as possible. Since the optimal nancing
contract ensures that Equation (5) is binding in all states of nature, we nd credit by adding this
constraint across states of nature:7
imw =
1
1  Hw!w+1 · w
· Hw
©
!w+1 · w · zw
ª
.( 1 0 )
Not surprisingly, credit increases with the wealth of entrepreneurs and their investment e!ciency,
and decreases with the nancial friction.
At the proposed interest rate and rm prices, non-entrepreneurs are indierent between lending
and purchasing old rms. If they choose the latter, they are also indierent regarding the amount
of investment and external nancing of their rms. As a group, non-entrepreneurs purchase the
stock of old rms, give credit to new rms and use any savings left to produce new capital within
their old rms. To verify that markets clear, we must check that this group has enough savings to
do all of this:
(1  %) · zw  iQ
w  Yw,( 1 1 )
where Yw 
R




w imw. We assume from now on that this condition holds and,
as a result, the conjectured interest rate and rm prices are veried.8




(w  1) · %
1  Hw!w+1 · w
¸
· (1  ) · n
w .( 1 2 )
7Adding up Equation (5) across states of nature yields:






w+1 · w · (zw + imw)+Ymw+1

,
where we have used that: (i) Equations (3) and (4) imply that I (omw>n mw)3zw·omw = ·n
31
w ·nmw; and (ii) entrepreneurs
put all of their savings in the rm and Equations (1) and (2) then imply that nmw+1 = w · (zw + imw).T o o b t a i n
Equation (10), we substitute in the conjectured interest rate and rm prices and solve for imw.
8This requires that:
1 3 Hw!w+1 · w 3 %
1 3 Hw!w+1 · w
· (1 3 ) · n

w D (1 3 ) · nw.
In terms of the primitives of the model, this implies that: (i) Hw!w+1 · w ? 1 3 % in all dates and states of nature,
and (ii)  is high enough. The rst restriction ensures that the credit constraint is tight enough so that, after giving
credit to new rms, non-entreprenurs still have some savings left in their hands. The second restriction ensures rm
prices are su!ciently low so that these savings are su!cient to purchase the stock of old rms.
9Investment spending consists of the savings of the young minus their purchases of old rms, i.e. zw 3 Yw =
(1 3 ) · n

w 3 (1 3 ) · nw. Of this total, new rms invest
%
1 3 Hw!w+1 · w
· (1 3 ) · n

w with e!ciency w,w h i l et h e
rest is invested by old rms with e!ciency one.14
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Equation (12) is the law of motion of the capital stock. The dynamics of this economy are akin to
those of a Solow model with shocks to the average e!ciency of investment. From any initial capital
stock, the economy converges towards a steady state in which the capital stock  uctuates within a
range that is dened by the support of the shocks. These shocks might originate in the investment
technology (w)o rt h enancial friction (!w), but have similar macroeconomic eects as they both
work through the average e!ciency of investment.
1.2 Looking to the crisis through the lens of the canonical model
We are ready to use the canonical model in the way that Gertler and Kiyotaki suggest, namely,
as a framework to help organize our thinking about the current crisis. Figure 1 illustrates the
stylized facts. The world economy entered a long and steady expansion around the mid 1990s, with
increases in consumption and investment. The prices of stocks, real estate and other assets grew
to unprecedented levels. Intermediation soared, while interest rates fell to historical lows. This
expansion lasted more than a decade, leading many to think that the business cycle was over. This
might have been too optimistic. But nobody anticipated what happened after the summer of 2007:
a sudden and sharp drop in stock and real estate prices, a massive collapse in intermediation and
the worst nancial crisis since the Great Depression. Since then, investment has come to a halt
and the world economy has experienced negative growth. We are only now starting to see the light
at the end of the tunnel.
The key question, of course, is how did all of this happen. Coming up with a convincing
explanation for such a sharp and unexpected change in economic outcomes is a fascinating academic
challenge with far reaching policy implications. At a deep level, explanations of the crisis fall
into one of two rough categories. The rst one includes explanations based on the notion that
something fundamental or technological has happened. These explanations emphasize aggregate
resource constraints and view the crisis as a negative shift of these constraints. A second set of
explanations start from the premise that nothing fundamental has changed, and that we are only
witnessing a massive coordination failure. This second set of explanations emphasize the role of
expectations and view the crisis as a negative shift in those.
The canonical model described above oers two alternative, but complementary, explanations
of the crisis: a shock to the investment technology, w; and a shock to the nancial friction, !w.
Both of these shocks are fundamental or technological, although they originate in dierent parts of
the economy: the corporate or the nancial sector, respectively. We consider each of them in turn.15
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Figure 2 shows the response of the economy to a transitory shock to the investment technol-
ogy.10>11 The dierent panels plot the assumed path for the shock (w) and the responses of the
capital stock (nw), consumption (fw), the stock market (Yw), the interest rate (HwUw+1)a n di n t e r -
mediation (iQ
w ).12 All variables are shown as deviations from the steady state. The increase in w
raises the average e!ciency of investment through two channels. For a given allocation of invest-
ment, new rms become more e!cient at investing. In addition, their net worth increases, relaxing
their credit constraint and allowing them to undertake a larger share of the economy’s investment.
The increase in the average e!ciency of investment shifts the law of motion of the capital stock
upwards and the economy starts transitioning towards a higher steady state. As this happens, the
capital stock and consumption increase. In the nancial market, the interest rate declines, while
intermediation and rm prices increase. When w goes back to its original level, all these changes
unwind. The law of motion of the capital stock goes back to its original shape and the capital stock
starts declining. Eventually, the economy goes back to its original steady state.
Figure 3 shows the response of the economy to a transitory shock to the nancial friction.13 We
have calibrated the shocks so that the quantitative eect on the average e!ciency of investment
is the same in Figures 2 and 3. The most remarkable aspect of Figure 3 is that it is almost a
carbon copy of Figure 2. The only dierence between these g u r e si st h a tF i g u r e3s h o w sal a r g e r
increase in intermediation. The reason is that shocks to the nancial friction only aect the average
e!ciency of investment through one channel: the net worth of rms increases, relaxing their credit
constraint and improving the allocation of investment. This is why a shock to !w requires a larger
increase in intermediation than a shock to w to obtain the same increase in the average e!ciency
of investment. Since shocks to w and !w are observationally equivalent from a macroeconomic
perspective, the only way to tell them apart would be to use microeconomic data to nd out
whether aggregate  uctuations in the average e!ciency of investment are due to rms being more
productive or having better access to credit.
The model is stylized and much work remains to be done to get it ready for serious quantitative
analysis. In particular, it can be extended along various dimensions to strengthen the nancial
10In particular, we assume that w =¯  if 0 $ w?Wand w =  for all w?0 and w D W,w i t h¯ A . To allow for
a clean experiment, we assume that !w = ! for all w, and that the economy was already in the steady state in period
w =0 .
11Table 1 in the appendix contains all information regarding the parametrization of Figures 2-3 and 6-8.
12The response of output and wages mimics that of the capital stock.
13In particular, we assume that Hw!w+1 = ¯ ! if 0 $ w?Wand Hw!w+1 = ! for all w?0 and w D W,w i t h¯ !A! .T o
allow for a clean experiment, we assume that w =  for all w, and that the economy was already in the steady state
in period w =0 .
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accelerator mechanism.14 But Figures 2 and 3 already show that it is possible to write down a
model based on fundamental or technological shocks to the corporate (i.e. w) and/or the nancial
sector (i.e. !w) that delivers dynamics that are qualitatively consistent with the evidence. Moreover,
the notion that it is a drop in aggregate net worth that has caused a collapse in intermediation is
certainly appealing as it conforms to the perceptions of many observers and market participants.
Not surprisingly then, much current research follows this research strategy.
Despite this, we remain unconvinced that the current crisis is the result of a technological
or fundamental shock. Even accounting for the amplifying forces of the nancial system, what
particular shock could have caused such a dramatic downturn as the one suered by the world
economy? It seems di!cult to identify a specic technological shock that could underlie such a
large change in the investment opportunities faced by rms. Likewise, it seems di!cult to identify
as p e c i c change in the institutional and/or technological framework of nancial markets that has
so suddenly left them so impaired to do their job. Neither the resources available for intermediation
nor the technology used for it seem to have changed much.
This is why we search for an alternative explanation of this crisis, one that can help us un-
derstand how output and wealth can fall so much even though resources and technology remain
apparently unchanged. We would like to do so by complementing the nancial accelerator frame-
work while preserving its central feature, namely, the predominant role of nancial frictions. If
successful, such an explanation could shed light on more than the recent past. Even before the cur-
rent crisis, the large and unpredictable  uctuations in the stock and housing markets of recent years
hardly mirrored the evolution of technological or fundamental shocks.15 And, with a longer-term
perspective that encompasses the whole of the postwar period, it appears that large  uctuations
in asset prices (and their macroeconomic implications) have hardly been uncommon. So we search
for an explanation of (i) why asset prices move in ways that are unrelated to fundamentals, and
(ii) how these movements in asset prices can lead to  uctuations in production with unchanged
resources. This does not require changing the model, but only the way we look at it. We show this
next.
14Most prominently,  uctuations in the relative price of assets can feed back into borrowing constraints and exac-
erbate volatility. See Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
15Although the recent evolution of real estate prices is perhaps too close to us to draw any denitive conclusions,
the stock price boom and bust of the late 1990s, which has been widely studied, seems hard to attribute to movements
in fundamentals. For a detailed discussion on this last point, see LeRoy (2004).17
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2 Bubbles as pyramid schemes
What is the price of a rm? We showed that the canonical model has an equilibrium in which the
price of a rm equals the cost that it would take to replace the capital it owns. This price is often
referred to as the fundamental value of a rm, since it also equals the net present value of all the
output that the capital owned by the rm will ever produce. But the canonical model has many
other equilibria in which rm prices are above their fundamental value. It is customary to refer
to these equilibria as bubbly, since they capture the notion of rms being overvalued or having a
bubble. We use these equilibria to sketch an alternative explanation of the current crisis.
2.1 Setup with bubbles
We solve the model again, conjecturing that the interest rate is still given by Equation (8) but that
rm prices are now given by:
Ymw =( 1 ) · nmw + emw,( 1 3 )
where emw is the overvaluation or bubble in rm m. The assumption that rm prices equal their
fundamental value can be expressed as the restriction that emw =0for all m and w. This restriction
cannot be justied on a priori grounds but there is always an equilibrium in which it is satised,
as we showed in the previous section. Equation (13) already points out to the rst macroeconomic
eect of bubbles: since rm prices are high, the amount of savings devoted to purchase the stock
of old rms increases and this reduces the funds available for investment.
At the proposed interest rate and rm prices, entrepreneurs strictly prefer to start new rms
than to lend or purchase old rms and, just as before, they ask for as much credit as possible:
imw =
1










.( 1 4 )
Equation (14) points out to the second macroeconomic eect of bubbles: since future rm prices are
high, entrepreneurs are able to obtain more credit and this improves the allocation of investments.
Of course, not any stochastic process for emw can be part of an equilibrium. Broadly speaking,
there are two restrictions or requirements that bubbles must satisfy. The rst one is that bubbles
should grow fast enough to be attractive. At the proposed interest rate and rm prices, non-18
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Equation (15) says that the expected growth rate of bubbles must equal the interest rate. If the
growth rate of the bubble were less than the interest rate, owning rms with a bubble would
not be attractive. This cannot be an equilibrium. If the growth rate of the bubble exceeded the
interest rate, non-entrepreneurs would want to borrow to purchase bubbly rms. This cannot be
an equilibrium either. The requirement that all bubbles have the same expected growth rate does
not mean that all bubbles must be correlated though.
The second requirement for a bubble to be part of the equilibrium is that it should not grow
too fast. Otherwise, the aggregate bubble would eventually be too large for the young to be able to
purchase it and markets would not clear. Knowing this, standard backward-induction arguments
would rule out the bubble today. To verify that markets clear, we must check that non-entrepreneurs
have enough savings to lend to entrepreneurs and purchase the stock of old rms. That, is, we
must check that Equation (11) holds. We keep assuming that this condition holds and, as a result,
the conjectured interest rate and rm prices are veried.16
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w31 emw.17 A comparison of Equations (12) and (16) shows that,
in principle, the eect of bubbles on capital accumulation is ambiguous. The last two terms of
Equation (16) show that purchasing the existing bubble reduces capital accumulation by diverting
resources away from investment. Since only non-entrepreneurs purchase bubbly rms and their
16This requires now that:
1 3 Hw!w+1 · 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1 3 Hw!w+1 · 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mw. The presence of bubbles makes the condition more stringent. Bubbles
raise both intermediation and the value of old rms, leaving less savings to produce capital within old rms.
17Investment spending consists of the savings of the young minus their purchases of old rms, i.e. zw 3 Yw =
(1 3 )·n

w 3(1 3 )·nw3ew3e
Q
w . Of this total, new rms invest
1
1 3 Hw!w+1 · w
·
#













with e!ciency w, while the rest is invested by old rms with e!ciency one.
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investment e!ciency is one, the existing bubble crowds out capital one to one. The second term
of Equation (16) shows that the expected bubble expands capital accumulation by relaxing credit
constraints, increasing intermediation and the average e!ciency of investment. To understand this









which enables them to expand borrowing by a factor of
1
1  Hw!w+1 · w
, and each unit borrowed
entails an e!ciency gain of w  1.18
To complete the description of the dynamics of the economy, we need to determine the evolution











.( 1 7 )
That is, the aggregate bubble grows faster than the interest rate because of the creation of new
rms and, with them, new bubbles too. Any sequence for nw>e w and eQ
w that satises Equations
(16) and (17) is an equilibrium, provided that Equation (11) holds in all dates and states of nature.
The dynamics of this economy depend on the dynamics of rm prices, and we turn to these next.
2.2 Bubbly episodes
Bubbly episodes can take place in the canonical model. Generically, the economy  uctuates between
periods in which ew = eQ
w =0and periods in which ew A 0 and/or eQ
w A 0. We say that the economy
is in the fundamental state if ew = eQ
w =0 . We say instead that the economy is experiencing a
bubbly episode if ew A 0 and/or eQ
w A 0. A bubbly episode starts when the economy leaves the
fundamental state and ends the rst period in which the economy returns to the fundamental state.
Let }w 5 {I>E} be a sunspot variable that determines the state of the economy. We refer to }w as
investor sentiment. The transition probabilities Pr(}w+1 = I |}w = E) and Pr(}w+1 = E |}w = I )
could be a function of any endogenous or exogenous variable of the model, and could  uctuate
randomly over time.
In the fundamental state, rm prices equal their fundamental values. Each period, there is some
probability that a bubble episode starts in the new generation of rms. When this happens, an
aggregate bubble appears and starts to grow according to Equation (17). This growth in the bubble
is due to two factors: (i) as the new rms become old, their bubble keeps growing at an expected
rate that equals the interest rate; and (ii) new bubbles appear in the successive generations of new
18This decomposition of the second term assumes that e
Q
w+1 and !w+1 are uncorrelated.
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rms. Throughout the bubbly episode, there is some probability that the episode ends and the
economy reverts to the fundamental state. When this happens, all bubbles burst and rm prices
go back to their fundamental values.
It turns out that this simple model can give rise to a wide array of equilibrium dynamics with
bubbly episodes of dierent sorts.19 To simplify the discussion, consider the simple example in
which the probability of an episode ending is constant, i.e. Pr(}w+1 = I |}w = E)=s;a n dt h er a t e
of bubbly creation is also constant, i.e. eQ
w = eQ A 0 when the episode starts and then eQ
w = q · ew
until the episode ends, with qA0. We also assume that Pr(}w+1 = E |}w = I ) is small, so that the
fundamental state is similar to the equilibrium of section 1. We use this example throughout the
paper for illustrative purposes. It nicely captures the notion of a shock to investor sentiment. In
the fundamental state, investors expect bubbles to appear with a low probability and, as a result,
they are not willing to purchase rms that are overvalued relative to the cost of replacing their
capital stock. During a bubbly episode, investors expect bubbles to survive with a high probability
and new bubbles to appear at a rate that is proportional to the stock of existing bubbles. Both
sets of expectations are self-fullling and this allows us to interpret transitions between these two
states as shocks to investor sentiment.
To be able to graphically describe the dynamics of the bubble during an episode, we further
simplify by assuming that there are no other type of shocks, i.e. w =  and !w = !.M o r e o v e r ,i f
the rate of depreciation is large, i.e.   1,w ec a nm a k et h em o d e lr e c u r s i v et h r o u g has i m p l et r a n s -
formation of variables. Dene {w as the bubble’s share of wealth or savings, i.e. {w 
ew
(1  ) · n
w
.









(  1) · %
1  ! · 
+
μ
(  1) · ! · q
1  ! · 
 1
¶
· (1 + q) · {w
,( 1 8 )
if }w+1 = E and {w+1 =0if }w+1 = I. Naturally, the derivation of Equation (18) assumes that
Equation (11) holds. This condition can now be rewritten as follows:
{w 
1  ! ·   %
1  ! · (  q)
· (1 + q)
31  ¯ {.( 1 9 )
The key observation is that the capital stock does not appear in Equations (18) and (19). Any path
19See Martin and Ventura (2010) for a full analysis of the set of equilibria in a related model.21
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for {w that that satises Equations (18) and (19) in all dates and states of nature is an equilibrium
of the economy. Since {w =0does this, we trivially have that such a path always exists. Of course,
the interesting question is whether more paths are possible and, if so, how do these paths look like.
Knowing this, we can then use Equation (16) to determine the associated paths for the capital
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  1) · %
1  ! · 
+
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! · (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1  ! · 
 1
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· (1 + q) · {w
¸
· (1  ) · n
w .( 2 0 )
This allows us to interpret bubbly episodes literally as shocks to the law of motion of the economy.
Equations (18) and (19) embody the two requirements for bubbly episodes to be part of an
equilibrium, and that we mentioned earlier. The rst one is that the bubble must be expected
to grow fast enough. Otherwise, holding the bubble would not be attractive and nobody would
purchase it. This requirement is embodied in Equation (18), which is nothing but a restatement
of Equation (15). The second requirement is that the bubble cannot be expected to grow too fast.
Otherwise, it would eventually exceed available funds and it could not be purchased. Knowing
this, standard backward-induction arguments would rule out the bubble today. This requirement
is embodied in Equation (19) which is nothing but a restatement of Equation (11). Equations (18)
and (19) can be used to show that bubbly episodes can happen if  is su!ciently low.
This example can generate two types of bubbly episodes. The rst type is the conventional or
contractionary bubbly episode emphasized by Tirole (1985). These episodes occur in economies
where some investments are dynamically ine!cient in the fundamental state, and they require
that
(  1) · ! · q
1  ! · 
? 1.20 This condition ensures that bubbles have a negative eect on capital
accumulation, as the reduction in investment spending is not compensated by the increase in the
average e!ciency of investment. Bubbles raise the interest rate and reduce the capital stock. Figure
4 illustrates one of these contractionary episodes.21 The thick line depicts Equation (18) and the
thin one depicts the 45 degree line. The initial bubble must be in the interval {v 5 [0>{ W]. After
the initial bubble appears, it declines as a share of wealth throughout. Only if the initial bubble is




( 3 1) · %
1 3 ! · 
.
21Since they naturally assume that  =1in order to illustrate the recursive characterization of {, Figures 4 and 5
are parametrized dierently than the rest.22
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maximal, i.e. {v = {W, this rate of decline becomes zero.
The second type of bubbly episode is the non-conventional or expansionary one analyzed by
Martin and Ventura (2010). These episodes arise in economies with nancial frictions, and exist
even if all investments are dynamically e!cient in the fundamental state. These episodes require
that
(  1) · ! · q
1  ! · 
A 1.22 This condition ensures that bubbles have a positive eect on capital
accumulation, as the reduction in investment spending is compensated by the increase in the average
e!ciency of investment. These bubbles reduce the interest rate and increase the capital stock.
Figure 5 illustrates one of them. The initial bubble can be anywhere the interval {v 5 [0> ¯ {].
Interestingly, these episodes might look quite dierent from the conventional ones. In particular,
episodes might start with a small bubble that gains momentum over time. These bubbles can
become very large before suddenly bursting.
2.3 Looking to the crisis through the lens of the canonical model, again
The canonical model therefore oers a third explanation of the crisis: a shock to investor senti-
ment. Since non-conventional or expansionary bubbles are the only ones that stand a chance to be
empirically relevant in the present situation, we focus on them in what follows. We would like to
stress once more that we are not changing the model of the economy, but only the way to use it.
Rather than looking for fundamental or technological explanations such as shocks to w and !w,w e
instead look for an explanation that relies on a coordination failure by focusing on shocks to }w.
Figure 6 shows the response of the economy to a shock to investor sentiment.23 We have
calibrated the shock so that its eects on the capital stock are roughly the same as those of the
technological shocks in Figures 2 and 3. The behavior of the dierent macroeconomic variables is
similar to those in these previous gures. The main dierence is that nancial variables tend to
 uctuate more in the case of a shock to }w. One reason is that the shock has a direct eect on rm
prices that is absent in the case of shocks to w and/or !w. In addition, high asset prices reduce
investment spending and this requires even a larger increase in intermediation to generate the same
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1 3 ! · 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
.
23In particular, we assume that }w = E if 0 $ w?Wand }w = I for all w?0 and w D W. To allow for a clean
experiment, we assume that w =  and !w = ! for all w, and that the economy was already in the steady state in
period w =0 .23
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increase in the capital stock.
The start of a bubble generates a positive wealth shock which can literally be described as a
transfer from the future. This is a central feature of a pyramid scheme where the initiator claims
that, by making him/her a payment now, the other party earns the right to receive a payment from
a third person later. By successfully creating and selling a bubble, entrepreneurs assign themselves
and sell the “rights” to the savings of a generation living in the very far future or, to be more exact,
living at innity. This appropriation of rights is a pure windfall or wealth gain for the entrepreneurs.
This wealth shock generates an e!ciency gain, as it helps overcome the negative eects of the
nancial friction. The bubble increases the net worth of entrepreneurs and allows new rms to
obtain more credit and invest more. In a very real sense, the bubble is like the oil that greases
the machinery that moves nancial markets. The rights to the future generated by the bubble
provide the collateralizable net worth that nancial markets need to work e!ciently. The bubble
t h u sr e s u l t si na ni n c r e a s e da v e r a g ee !ciency of investment. This is why the eects of a shock to
investor sentiment resemble those of fundamental shocks.
As a research strategy, viewing the current crisis as the bursting of a macroeconomic pyramid
scheme or bubble seems to overcome the shortcomings of alternatives that rely on technological
shocks. In particular, it explains (i) why asset prices move in ways that are often unrelated to
fundamentals; and (ii) why these movements in asset prices can lead to  uctuations in production
with unchanged resources. Moreover, this alternative view of the crisis fundamentally aects the
role of scal policy as a stabilization tool. We turn to this topic next.
3 Policy implications
We have modeled the current crisis as a negative shock to net worth that led to a collapse of
intermediation and the average e!ciency of investment. Is there anything that governments can do
to reverse such a situation? If the shock is fundamental or technological, the canonical model cannot
provide a meaningful answer to this question since it lacks a good description of the microeconomics
of productivity and the nancial friction. But if the shock is the bursting of a bubble, the canonical
model turns out to be quite useful for policy analysis. Keeping with the exploratory spirit of these
notes, we add a government to the framework developed above and draw some tentative results.24
24This section is closely related to Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006), Kraay and Ventura (2007) and Kocher-
lakota (2009), who also explore the role of scal policy following the bursting of a bubble.24
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3.1 Setup with a government
Assume next that the world economy contains a government that gives subsidies to rms and
nances these subsidies by taxing individuals and issuing debt. Unlike much of the recent literature
on the crisis, we do not to give the government an advantage over the market as a lender. Instead,
we assume the government enforces payments due by using the same legal system and related
institutional arrangements as the private sector.25 This implies that it is not possible to improve
the allocation of investments without raising the net worth of new rms.26
Let Wlw and Vmw be the tax levied on individual l and the subsidy given to rm m in period w.
The government borrows by issuing one-period bonds which yield a (gross) return equal to Ug
w+1.
As in the case of private debt, we allow this return to be fully contingent and therefore to vary
across states of nature. This could re ect a contingent contractual rate, or the government’s failure
to keep with its contractual obligations. Let gw b et h ep a y m e n t sm a d et od e b t h o l d e r si np e r i o dw.
Then, the government’s budget constraint can be written as follows:
gw+1 = Ug
w+1 · (gw + Vw  Ww),( 2 1 )
where Ww 
R
lMLw Wlw and Vw 
R
mMMw Vmw. Equation (21) says that the government borrows to make
debt payments, i.e. gw,a n dt onance the primary budget decit, i.e. Vw  Ww.
The presence of the government has no eect on technology, i.e. Equations (1) and (2); or the
functioning of the labor market, i.e. Equations (3) and (4). It does however aect the nancial
market in three specic ways: (i) there is now an additional market for government debt; (ii) taxes
reduce the savings available to purchase nancial assets; and (iii) subsidies improve the balance
sheet of rms and therefore their net worth. This last eect means that Equation (5) should be
replaced by the following one:
Uw+1 · imw  !w+1 · [I (omw+1>n mw+1)  zw+1 · omw+1 + Vmw + Ymw+1].( 2 2 )
25For instance, some of the policies advocated by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Curdia and Woodford (2010) are
based on the assumption that (at least, after the crisis) the government is better at lending than the private sector.
26Consider a proposal for the government to lend to new rms. Since the total amount of resources that the legal
system can extract from these rms is xed, any lending done by the the government uses up an equivalent amount
of net worth. If nanced by issuing debt and/or taxing non-entrepreneurs, government lending crowds out private
credit one-to-one. Even worse, if partly nanced by taxing entrepreneurs, government lending crowds out private
credit more than one-to-one. The reason is that taking away resources from entrepreneurs lowers the net worth of
their rms.25
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Equation (22) recognizes that future subsidies also constitute a source of revenue for the rm. The
conditions for maximization also need to be modied as follows:
HwUw+1 = HwUg





w+1 · [Dmw · ]mw +( 1 ) · nmw]  Uw+1 · imw + Vmw + Ymw+1
ª
Ymw + ]mw  imw







w+1 · Dmw · ]mw  Uw+1 · imw + Vmw + Ymw+1
ª
]mw  imw
if m 5 MQ
w .( 2 4 )
Equations (23) and (24) are natural generalizations of Equations (6) and (7). Equation (23) says
that maximization by nonentrepreneurs requires that the expected return to owning an old rm
and holding government debt must equal the interest rate. Equation (24) says that maximization
by entrepreneurs implies that starting new rms must yield a return that is at least as high as the
interest rate.
We conjecture that rm prices and the interest rate on private credit are still given by Equations
(13) and (8), respectively. In addition, we conjecture that the expected return on government debt
is given by:
HwUg
w+1 =  · n31
w+1 +1 .( 2 5 )
Equation (25) says that government debt must oer the same expected return as private credit.
This is a direct implication of risk neutrality.
At the proposed interest rate and rm prices, entrepreneurs strictly prefer to start new rms
than to lend or purchase old rms and, just as before, they ask for as much credit as possible:
imw =
1










,( 2 6 )
where Wlw are the taxes levied on the entrepreneur that starts and owns rm m. Intermediation
decreases with taxes on entrepreneurs and increases with subsidies to new rms.
At the proposed interest rate and rm prices, non-entrepreneurs are indierent among lending
to new rms, buying government debt or purchasing old rms. If they choose the latter, they are
also indierent regarding the amount of investment and external nancing of their rms. As a
group, the non-entrepreneurs purchase the stock of old rms, give credit to new rms, buy the
government debt and use any savings left to produce new capital within their old rms. To verify26
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that markets clear, we must check now that:











w Wlw. We keep assuming that this condition holds and our conjecture is veried.27






w31 Vmw.28 A comparison of Equations (16) and (28) shows that scal policy has two
eects on capital accumulation. The rst one is the conventional crowding-out eect, captured by
the last two terms of Equation (28). As the debt grows, it absorbs a larger fraction of the savings
of the young generation and this diverts resources away from capital accumulation. But there is
also a second eect here that is due to the nancial friction and is captured by the second term of
Equation (28). Subsidies to new rms foster capital accumulation by relaxing credit constraints,
increasing intermediation and the average e!ciency of investment. For the opposite reasons, taxes
to entrepreneurs reduce capital accumulation.
To complete the description of the dynamics of the economy, we still need Equation (17) de-
scribing the evolution of the aggregate bubble and, in addition, we need the following equation






· (gw + Vw  Ww).( 2 9 )
Equation (29) follows from Equations (21) and (25). The equilibrium depends on the scal policy
adopted by the government. A scal policy is a feasible sequence for taxes and subsidies, i.e. Wlw
27This requires now that:
1 3 Hw!w+1 · w 3 %


































Wmw. Note that taxes on entrepreneurs relax this condition while debt and subsidies tighten it.
28Investment spending consists of the savings of the young minus their purchases of old rms and government debt,
i.e. zw 3 Ww 3 Yw 3 (gw + Vw 3 Ww)=( 13 ) · n

w 3 (1 3 ) · nw 3 ew 3 e
Q
w 3 gw 3 Vw. Of this total, new rms invest
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with e!ciency w, while the rest is invested by
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and Vmw, and a return process Ug
w+1 satisfying Equation (25). Once this policy has been specied,
any sequence for nw, gw, ew and eQ
w that satises Equations (17), (28) and (29) is an equilibrium,
provided that Equation (27) holds in all dates and states of nature. We show next how scal policy
works in some of these equilibria.
3.2 ‘Undoing’ the crisis?
Let us start with a disclaimer: we do not search for the optimal scal policy. Instead, we focus on
the more modest question of whether the government can use scal policy to reverse the situation
and bring the economy back to the pre-crisis growth path. This might be a desirable goal for
most individuals, but not necessarily for all as some might benet from the crisis. Moreover, the
pre-crisis path might not be the optimal path in any meaningful way. To determine the optimal
path, we need to give weights to the welfare of dierent individuals by choosing a social welfare
function. We do not do this here.
The key observation is that the bubble implements a series of intragenerational and inter-
generational transfers that the government might be able to replicate with scal policy. In fact,
Equations (17), (28) and (29) provide a simple blueprint for scal policy to undo the crisis. We
now develop this blueprint for our example of section 2, assuming initially that government debt is
non-contingent so that Equation (29) holds ex-post and not just in expectation:
1. Suppose that the bubble has burst at time W.S e t a l l scal variables equal to zero, i.e.
Wlw = Vmw = gw =0for w = W>W +1 >===, l 5 Lw and m 5 Mw, and use Equations (17) and (28) to
describe the desired bubbly equilibrium. Let ˆ ew and ˆ eQ
w describe this equilibrium.
2. Then, set the following targets for scal variables for w = W>W +1 >===:( i )gw+1 =( 1 s) ·
³
ˆ ew+1  ew+1
´
;( i i )VQ
w+1 =( 1 s) · q ·
³
ˆ ew+1  ew+1
´




· (1 + q) · s,
with WH
w =0 .F i n a l l y ,s e tVW =0and distribute WW randomly among the old.29
This simple algorithm describes the scal policy that replicates the desired bubbly equilibrium.
When a bubbly episode ends and the economy reverts to the fundamental state with ew = eQ
w =0 ,
this scal policy steps in and keeps the economy in the same growth path. The government issues








= ˆ ew · (1 + q),w h e r et h el a s te q u a l i t y
29This implies that Equation (17) is valid throughout. Assume instead that the government used these resources
to bail out bubble owners. Then, we should modify Equation (17) as bubble owners would not suer any loss after
the bubble collapse. This shows that bubble dynamics depend on expected bailout policies.28
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follows from Equation (17). Of the revenue raised from the sale of this debt, the government
devotes gw =( 1s)·ˆ ew to repaying bondholders and VQ
w =( 1s)·ˆ ew ·q to subsidizing productive
rms. This scheme is not only feasible but it turns out that Ww+1 = ˆ ew · (1 + q) · s?0 and the
government makes prots from running it! Since the economy has not left the pre-crisis growth
path, these prots can be used to raise consumption for each generation.
Where are these prots coming from? The proposed scal policy ensures that the market value
of government debt equals that of the disappeared bubble in each period: hence, non-entrepreneurs
devote the same resources to purchase the debt than they would have devoted to purchase the
bubble. These resources strictly exceed those that are needed to pay maturing debt and to nance
the subsidies that prevent a fall in the net worth of rms. This is because, unlike the bubble, the
government implements these transfers without risk. Hence, the actual interest payments that the
government must make to bondholders at each point in time are below the realized return to the
bubble during the episode. Likewise, the subsidy that the government must make to productive
rms in order to prevent a fall in their net worth is lower than the one implemented through bubble
creation. Government debt is a Ponzi scheme and, as a result, it extracts a transfer from the future
just like the bubble. Since government debt never bursts, it does so more e!ciently.
Does this mean that undoing the crisis is too modest a goal for scal policy? Should government
debt permanently substitute bubbles as a way to help the credit market to work better? A long
history of sovereign debt crises around the world and the recent events in European sovereign debt
markets strongly suggest a negative answer to this question. To see this, we generalize slightly the
example and recognize that shocks to investor sentiment also aect the sovereign debt market. In
particular, there are two states for this variable. With probability 1t, investors expect government
debt will be rolled over with a high probability and are willing to purchase it. With probability
t, investors expect government debt not to be rolled over and do not purchase it. We have not
formally modeled the objectives of the government, and we will abstain from doing so. Instead,
we simply assume that the government defaults on its debt if there is a rollover crisis. This makes
rollover crises possible. When such a crisis occurs, the government debt vanishes just like bubbles
burst at the end of a bubbly episode.
With rollover crises, the blueprint above is still valid provided we slightly generalize the second
step as follows:
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³
ˆ ew+1  ew+1
´






ˆ ew+1  ew+1
´









w =0 .F i n a l l y ,s e tVW =0and distribute WW randomly among the old.
The blueprint is basically the same as before, but scal policy now makes losses if tAs .T h e
probability of a rollover crisis results in the need to pay high interest rates and promise large
subsidies. Public promises are so risky that they require the government to raise taxes in every
period to keep its policy running. In fact, the policy may become altogether unfeasible if t is
su!ciently high, since the path of taxation required to sustain it would eventually violate Equation
(27). In this case, government credibility is so low that it is impossible for it to replicate the bubble.
The government might still attempt to undo the crisis, but this attempt might fail and lead to a
sovereign debt crisis.30
This simple model therefore provides a useful perspective on the current situation of the world
economy. As in the blueprint above, the policy response to the crisis has been a massive buildup in
government debt. It remains to be seen, however, how much of this buildup has been productively
used to raise the net worth of e!cient rms. Overall, it seems clear though that government debt
has not proved to be superior to the bubble. The world economy has not yet recovered its pre-crisis
growth path and, after the initial buildup, scal policy has not yielded prots but losses. At the
time of writing these notes, events seem to have taken a turn for the worse. The market has lost
condence on governments and the crisis has moved across markets, from private nancial markets
to public-debt markets. The current outlook remains as uncertain as ever.
4 International transmission
U pt on o ww eh a v el o o k e da tt h ee ects of bubbles on the world economy as a whole, as if borders
did not matter. To some extent, this approach seems quite appropriate. The current crisis has
propagated across industrial countries with a speed and strength that suggest borders do not matter
much anymore. But this is in itself an interesting observation. It raises the question of how shocks
to investor sentiment are transmitted across countries. To tackle this question, we break the world
economy into various countries. For simplicity, we assume that there are no governments.31
30Another reason to think that government debt is inferior is that the ability of the government to target subsidies
e!ciently might be low. That is, the parameter q might be lower for government debt. This seems quite realistic
and important, but we do not pursue it here.
31Ventura (2011) also provides a world equilibrium model of bubbles and explores how shocks are propagated across
countries.30
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4.1 A reinterpretation of the model
We shall think next of the world economy as containing F countries, indexed by f =1 >===>F.T h e s e
countries are split into two groups: high- and low-productivity. Countries in the high-productivity
group have an investment e!ciency equal to w, while countries in the low-productivity group have
an investment e!ciency equal to one. Thus, the countries in the high-productivity group contain
a fraction % of the world’s population and these are the “entrepreneurs” of the world economy.
We need to make assumptions about the geographical extent of markets. It is natural to
assume that labor markets are local so that workers can only be hired to work with capital located
within the same country. This does not preclude however that goods trade arbitrage away wage
dierences across countries. In particular, we modify slightly the basic model by assuming that
rms produce output with a Cobb-Douglas technology that uses capital and an intermediate input:
I (pmw>n mw)=p13
mw · n
mw;w h e r epmw is the intermediate. To produce one unit of pmw, one unit of
labor is required. Free trade ensures that the price of the intermediate input is the same in all
countries. Perfect competition ensures that the wage rate equals the price of the intermediate in
each country. Thus, wages are equalized across countries even though labor markets are local.32
Moreover, the equilibrium wage is still given by Equation (4).
Financial markets are global in nature so that individuals and rms can trade goods and assets
with individuals and rms in other countries. Thus, there is a single world interest rate and set
of rm prices, and it is straightforward to show that these are given by Equations (8) and (13).
At these interest rate and rm prices, entrepreneurs in the group of high-productivity countries
strictly prefer to start new rms than to lend or purchase old rms and, as a result, they ask for
as much credit as possible. Assume country f belongs to the group of high-productivity countries.
Then, this country will borrow from the rest of the world the following amount:
ifw =
Hw!w+1
1  Hw!w+1 · w
·
Ã







where vf is the fraction of the world population located in country f. In addition, all the old rms
in country f will be sold to foreigners. At the proposed interest rate and rm prices, the group of
low-productivity countries are indierent between purchasing old rms at home or abroad, investing
32This result is nothing but the factor-price equalization theorem of international trade. The intermediate input is
labor-intensive and the nal good is capital-intensive. Countries with high capital-labor ratios import the intermediate
input and export the nal good, while countries with low capital-labor ratios do the opposite.31
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in them, and lending if Equation (15) holds. In this reinterpretation of the model bubbles thus
help channel resources from low- to high-productivity countries. To verify the conjectured interest
rate and prices, we keep assuming that Equation (11) holds.
We can now describe the dynamics of this economy. Aggregating Equation (1), the law of
motion of the aggregate or world capital stock nw is still given by Equation (16). Equation (17)
describing the dynamics of the aggregate bubble still applies. But it is useful to disaggregate these











,f o r f =1 >===>F,( 3 1 )
where efw and eQ
fw be the set of old and new bubbles in country f. Note that, in the group of
low-productivity countries, eQ
fw =0since no new rms are being created there.33
We have now reinterpreted our model of the world economy as one with many countries. Any
sequence for nw>e fw and eQ









fw is an equilibrium, provided that Equation (11) holds in all dates and states of
nature. We examine some of these equilibria next.
4.2 International transmission
Now a bubbly episode starts a whole system of country bubbles. We can study such an episode
by using a variation of the example developed in section 2. In particular, we assume that during a
bubbly episode: (i) bubble creation evolves according to eQ
fw = q · [$f · ew +( 1 $) · efw] in the set
of high-productivity countries, where $ 5 (0>1) and $f is a nonnegative constant that must add up
to $ among all productive countries; (ii) in any given period, there is a xed probability sq that
bubble creation stops and q becomes zero thereby ending the bubbly episode, and (iii) in any given
period, and for each high-productivity country f,t h e r ei saxed probability sf that the existing
stock of the country’s bubble bursts, i.e. that efw =0 . Our process of bubble creation therefore
implies that creation in each country depends on both local and global conditions, whereas total
bubble creation remains a xed fraction q of the world bubble. We can think of our example of
33How can there be old bubbles in the group of low-productivity countries? We do not rule out the possibility
that countries transition between groups during a bubbly episode. To keep things simple, we assume that the set
of countries transitioning in both directions has the same size so that % is constant. Not much would change if we
allowed the relative size of the groups to vary.32
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section 2 as the particular case in which sf =0 .34
In this generalization of our example, the world equilibrium is still formally described by Equa-
tions (18) to (20), with the only dierence that (1s) now stands for the product (1sq)·(1sf).
Any country bubble is now subject to two types of uncertainty. There is, as in section 2, the risk
that investors become pessimistic regarding the worldwide bubble creation as captured by sq:t h e s e
expectations immediately end the bubbly episode. Beyond that, there is also the risk that investors
become pessimistic regarding the value of existing rms in a particular country as captured by
sf: these expectations cause that country’s bubble to burst even if the episode in itself continues.
Formally, these country-specic changes in sentiment have no eects on the aggregate properties
of the bubbly episode but they do aect the distribution of real and nancial activity throughout
the high-productivity world.
To see this, consider that there is a negative shock to investor sentiment that bursts the bubble in
country f. On impact, this shock reduces the size of the world bubble. But we have already discussed
how, in this type of episode, the current size of the bubble is positively related to expectations
regarding bubble creation in the future. By reducing the world bubble, this negative shock is
thus immediately transmitted to the value of productive rms and to their net worth all over
the world. Investor pessimism regarding country f therefore brings about a global slowdown:
nancial intermediation contracts worldwide, there is a drop in total capital  ows towards the set
of developed countries and the e!ciency of investment naturally falls as well. This slowdown is
somewhat persistent because the initial fall in the capital stock depresses wages all over the world,
which further reduces the net worth of rms and tightens their borrowing constraints even further.
All of these eects are particularly acute in country f s i n c ei ti st h e r et h a tt h ef a l li nn e tw o r t hi s
most pronounced.
As painful as the collapse of a country bubble may be, its eects on the real and nancial
aggregates of the world economy are transitory. The reason is that all basic features of the bubbly
process remain unaected: worldwide bubble creation remains a xed fraction of the aggregate
bubble so that, as can be seen from Equation (18), a partial collapse of the bubble has no long-
run eects on the dynamics of the episode. Such a collapse also has transitory implications for
the distribution of real and nancial activity. When the bubble bursts in a particular country,
our process for eQ
fw implies that bubble creation is temporarily redirected away from that country
34Note that in this example we are implicitly assuming that countries do not transition between the low- and
high-productivity groups during the bubbly episode.33
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towards the rest of the high-productivity world. Other high-productivity countries thus see their
rate of bubble creation rise to partially occupy the space of the disappeared one. As wages and
the interest rate return to their pre-crisis levels, however, country f eventually recovers from the
collapse of its bubble and so does its share of the world bubble, of worldwide bubble creation and
of intermediation and entrepreneurial rents.
Figures 7 and 8 show the response of the economy to a such a country-specic shock to investor
sentiment. The example depicts a world divided into two productive countries of equal size, that
we denote by Home and Foreign, and an unproductive rest of the world. Figure 7 illustrates the
response of world aggregates to the bursting of the bubble in Home, whereas Figure 8 illustrates
the responses of the country variables.35 We have calibrated the bubbly episode so that it is exactly
the same as the one in gure 6. Figure 7 illustrates how the collapse of the bubble in Home brings
about a worldwide recession. On impact, all nancial and real indicators fall, including capital,
consumption, the stock market and nancial intermediation. From there, the world economy re-
covers as the bubble returns to its pre-crisis size. Figure 8 decomposes these eects at the country
level. It shows how the recession aects Foreign even though the fall is naturally more severe in
Home. The gure also illustrates how the collapse of the bubble in Home has transitory eects on
the distribution of economic activity between both productive countries.
This example provides an illustration of how changes in investor sentiment regarding a particular
country can have global eects.36 This transmission operates partly through factor markets because
the collapse of the bubble in one country depresses wages worldwide, which reduces the net worth of
all productive rms. But it also operates through investor expectations, when changes in investor
sentiment regarding one part of the world aect investor sentiment elsewhere. This is a new and
powerful channel of transmission of shocks that is absent when, as is customary in macroeconomics,
one insists on focusing exclusively on the fundamental equilibrium.37
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the presence of many countries does not aect the global
35We assume that the world is in a bubbleless steady state in period w =0 . At that time, there is a shock to
investor sentiment that starts a bubbly episode in the world. At time W, however, the bubble of Home bursts.
36Here we have referred to the international transmission of changes in investor sentiment at the country-level, but
the same logic could be applied to study the transmission of sector-level shocks within an economy. The working-paper
version of these notes contains an example along these lines.
37In our example, investor pessimism regarding the value of rms in one country reduces expected bubble creation
all over the world, but there are other mechanisms through which changes in investor sentiment at the country
or regional level could have global eects. A shock to investor sentiment at the country level could, for example,
bring the world’s bubbly episode to an end. One way in which this could happen is if bubble creation is su!ciently
concentrated in one country. In this case, the end of this creation due to a change in investor expectations might
make the world bubble unsustainable.
2834
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blueprint for scal policy that we described in the previous section. It does however raise some
new issues such as the sharing of costs and benets from such a policy. We have little to say on
this matter, since we have not formally modeled government objectives. But we shall mention
two results that follow straight from the model. The rst one is that government spending should
increase in the group of high-productivity countries, but not in the group of low-productivity ones.
The reason is that this spending consists of subsidies to new rms that raise their collateral. The
second result is that, to the extent that countries have dierent credibility, government debt should
be issued only by the countries with the highest credibility. The reason is that this lowers the cost
of scal policy and the probability of a rollover crisis. This means a possible decoupling between
the countries that spend and the ones that borrow and this is likely to lead to frictions among
policymakers. This is, we think, as far as we can take the model in these notes in this direction.
Further research on the eects of scal policy in a world of bubbles is certainly needed.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
These notes have developed a model of the nancial accelerator in which bubbly episodes arise in
equilibrium. We have used this model to explore a view of the current crisis as a shock to investor
sentiment that led to the collapse of a bubble or pyramid scheme in nancial markets. According to
this view, asset prices today depend on market expectations of future asset prices. When investor
sentiment is high, asset prices are high and this raises the net worth of rms, relaxing their credit
constraints and improving the allocation of investment. This fosters credit, capital accumulation
and consumption. When investor sentiment is low, the opposite occurs: lower asset prices reduce the
net worth of rms, tightening their credit constraints and worsening the allocation of investment.
This leads to a reduction in credit, capital accumulation and consumption.
As a research strategy, viewing the current crisis as the collapse of a bubble is more appealing
than alternatives that rely on fundamental or technological shocks. It provides a simple unied nar-
rative of the main macroeconomic developments of the recent past and the current crisis. Namely,
the crisis was caused by the collapse of a bubbly episode that had sustained a steady expansion in
net worth, output and consumption since the 1990s. This narrative is consistent with the fact that
the expansionary phase was gradual and protracted while the recessionary phase has been sudden
and sharp. It does not require us to identify a large and negative fundamental or technological
shock to blame for the current state of the world economy. It can also account for the connection35
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(or lack of connection!) between nancial and real economic activity, and the speed and strength
with which shocks are transmitted across dierent sectors or countries. Finally, it provides us with
a simple blueprint for the design of scal policies to ‘undo’ the crisis, although it also highlights
that these policies rely on government commitment for their success. In the absence of such com-
mitment, these policies might simply move the crisis across markets, from private nancial markets
to public-debt markets.
The analytical framework developed in these notes allows us to think through various aspects
of the current crisis. Moreover, it can be fruitfully extended in various relevant directions. The rst
one is to introduce a more realistic description of labor markets. The crisis has led to a signicant
increase in unemployment throughout the world. Our model, with  exible wages and a fully inelastic
labor supply, has nothing to say about the connection between bubbles and unemployment. The
second extension is to introduce money and explore the role of monetary policy in counteracting the
crisis. As it stands now, the only role for money in our model would be as a store of value, and there
would be little formal distinction between monetary and scal policy. To follow current practice
in monetary economics, we would need to introduce money as a unit of account and allow for
nominal rigidities. A third and nal extension is to explicitly introduce government objectives and
constraints. Political economy issues have played an important role in the unfolding and handling
of this crisis. A particularly important observation is that, even though the current crisis has a
global nature, scal and monetary policies around the world are decided at the country or regional
level. It seems crucial to analyze the implications of this mismatch between economic and political
borders.36
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Table 1: Parameter Values for Figures
Figures Parameter  Description  Value  Shock 


D Capital share  1/3 -  - 
G Rate of depreciation  0.78 -  - 
H Measure of entrepreneurs  0.05 -  - 
I Financial friction  0.18 -  - 
S Investment efficiency  4.20 -  - 

2-3
S Investment efficiency  - -  St 4.5, tෛ[0,T) 
I Financial friction  - -  It 0.2, tෛ[0,T) 
6
p Probability of bubbly episode ending  0.2 -  - 
n Rate of bubbly creation  0.7 -  - 
b0/(1-D)k0
D Initial bubble as share of savings  0.2 bt=0, tT
7-8
pn Probability of bubbly episode ending   0.11 -  - 
Pc
Probability of each country bubble 
bursting  0.11 -  - 
sc
Measure of entrepreneurs in country 
cෛ{H,F}  0.025 -  - 
Zc
Bubble creation as a share of world 
bubble in country cෛ{H,F}  0.425 -  - 
Z
Bubble creation as a share of own 




D Initial bubble as share of savings in 
country cෛ{H,F}  0.1 b
H
t=0, t=T 
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no 1118 / november 2009
DiScretionary  
FiScal PolicieS  
over the cycle
neW eviDence  
baSeD on the eScb 
DiSaggregateD aPProach
by Luca Agnello  
and Jacopo Cimadomo